Stephens Light Artillery was named after the Vice President of the Confederacy, Alexander Stephens. His homeplace was Crawfordville, Georgia where Stephens Light was mustered into Confederate service in September of 1861. Taliaferro and Wilkes Counties contributed 165 men toward the southern cause. There first tour of duty was in the Georgia District commanded by Brig. Gen. A.R. Lawton. This District was merged into the Dept. of South Carolina, Georgia, and Florida on November fifth, 1861. On July 23, 1862, Gen. Lawton left this District to command “Stonewall” Jackson’s own Division. He was replaced by Brig. Gen. W.H. Mercer who commanded until his reassignment in November 11, 1863.¹

Their mission was to protect the Georgia coastline from the anticipated Northern blockaders and possible invasion of northern troops from the sea. The Department of South Carolina, Georgia and Florida used their talents until 1863 when Stephens Light Artillery was transferred to Sweetwater, Tennessee. Their unit affiliations were convoluted as the war changed but they initially began with Major Robert Cobb’s Artillery Battalion. This was later changed to Major Joseph Palmer’s Battalion. This Battalion was part of Major General Carter L. Stevenson’s Division of General John C. Breckenridge’s Corps, Army of Tennessee. Breckenridge’s Corps changed to Hardee’s Corps before too long.² Under Stevenson’s Division, Stephen’s Light was commanded by Capt. John B. Rowan and the Artillery Battalion commanded by Capt. Robert Cobb.³

Stephens Light was reorganized and incorporated the veteran and highly experienced Third Maryland Battery. The Third Maryland had a varied battle background having fought in several of the early battles, attacked northern shipping and warships on the Mississippi River, fought on Confederate cotton-clad ships, and won distinction in the actions. They were part of the surrendered garrison at Vicksburg and took their parole there. After their parole the unit received a 30-day furlough at Enterprise, Mississippi. Unable to return to their command in Dalton, Georgia they became part of a cavalry company in the Jonesboro, Tennessee area.⁴ The Third Marylanders brought with them four twelve pound Napoleon cannons that had been captured at Chickamauga.⁵ Interestingly enough, it was common practice to name the battery after the captain. Since Stephens Light Artillery was a Georgia unit it kept its name for its namesake Alexander Stephens but after incorporating the Third Maryland, the battery was commanded by Captain John B. Rowan of the Third Maryland. Lieutenants Ritter and Giles, also from the Third Maryland Battery, became the newest section commanders.⁶ At this time, the manpower was limited: seventy three effectives, a total of eighty one present, and an aggregate of one hundred twenty nine present and absent. There were only eighty rounds of ammunition per gun.⁷ Prior to the battles along the Tennessee and Georgia state lines and the Atlanta Campaign, the 40th, 41st, 43rd, 52nd, and 56th Georgia Infantry Regiments transferred twenty seven men to bring the battery up to one hundred three men ready for action and action they were going to get.

Joseph Hooker’s Federal XX Corps attacked the Confederate right at Lookout Mountain, Tennessee on November 23, 1863. Johnston’s Battalion withdrew the evening of the 23rd to Missionary Ridge and supported Cheatham’s Division again on the Confederate right at Tunnel Hill, Georgia. The next day, the 24th, Sherman sent six divisions against the Confederate forces at Tunnel Hill. Stevens Light’s sister batteries Carnes’ Tennessee and Cherokee Light being engaged. Stephens Light was held in reserve.⁸ The Confederate line was being supported solidly and one division even inflicted over fifteen hundred casualties along with eight stands of Federal colors.⁹ Major General Stevenson in his order to his division congratulated his men and his artillery (which included Stephens Light) on the fact that “whatever happened elsewhere, they had held their ground, repulsing every assault, and that Cummings Brigade had actually charged and routed the enemy in their front, capturing several



colors”.¹⁰ The terrain that had been an asset against the Union attacks now became a hindrance as the Confederate batteries tried to extricate their equipment lest it fall into the hands of the enemy. Darkness added to the confusion but the cannoneers were able to use the faint light of the burning Chickamauga Creek bridge to help light their way. The bridge had been torched by the Confederate rear guard to prevent Union pursuit. The last gun of the battery drove to safety across the already flaming bridge.¹¹

Dalton, Georgia was considered by the Federal troops to be the Georgia Gibraltar. Union Gen. Sherman knew that Confederate General Joseph Johnston would have fortified his position in the extreme and so he began his soon to be famous flanking movements to go around Johnston’s army. There were many trails and small wagon roads through the hills around Dalton. Johnston himself said that the position only looked good when in fact he would have preferred to withdraw to the vicinity of Calhoun. However, President Jefferson Davis and the Confederate Secretary of War required him to winter in Dalton.¹²

In December of 1863, the artillery battalion was changed from Cobb to Major Joseph Palmer.¹³ During this winter of 1863-1864, forage for the stock was difficult to find and of poor quality when found. Stephens Light Artillery was stationed at Kingston near Hightower Creek. Nothing was issued by the government and what was given was half rations and often rotten. The Quartermaster Department was uniformly inefficient at supplying the needs of the soldiers much less the animals. Georgia farmers had arranged to pay their taxes with produce (called “tax-in-kind”). Because of the lack of coordination by the Quartermaster Department and the meager means of railroad transportation, food for the stock laid rotting along the Western and Atlantic Railroad forcing the forage wagons, pulled by horses taken from the battery wagons and forge wagons, to run day and night. The horses became so hungry that they ate their own bridles and harnesses-an interesting parallel to the starving Confederate soldiers that on occasion were driven to cooking and chewing parts of their own leather gear. The stock became infected with a contagious disease called “epidemic catarrh”. Fourteen horses died in January, 1864.

Since medicines were part of the Union blockade contraband list, no care could be given so many more became infected. Several of the batterymen were barefoot. Captain Rowan angrily began a correspondence battle with the Quartermaster Department. In these communications, Captain Rowan spoke of having only forty eight well horses and ten that were unfit for service. He had three wagons with only twelve mules of which three are unfit for service. There were no mule harnesses at all and he complained of ruining the mules using artillery harnesses on them. He needed rope for picket lines, harnesses to replace the ones eaten by the horses, and a few saddles. On February, 1864 Rowan got a return message request him to fill out the proper requisition forms. In April, Rowan finally received new horses but nothing to feed them on except corn. As he noted, this would promote disease without the long feed. Even Major John W. Johnston spoke of not having fodder for four days and the last few pounds were rotten to be almost worthless.¹⁴

In the accounts listings by General Joseph E. Johnston entered during the winter quarters at Dalton, Georgia, February 29, 1864, Major Melancthon Smith took over the artillery in Hardee’s Corps. The listing showed forty seven officers and nine hundred seventy men present for duty. The effectives total present was nine hundred forty eight with the aggregate present being one thousand one hundred sixty four. The aggregate present and absent was one thousand seven hundred fifty four with forty five pieces of artillery.¹⁵ Included in this total were the sixty men sent by the State of Georgia and fifteen volunteers.¹⁶

The need for equipment for men and beast was not gone in March, 1864. The four Napoleons were still there, the one hundred forty men were still present for duty but Captain Rowan listed that sixty two horses were needed. During this period, Stephens Light Artillery was a part of Major Joseph Palmer’s battalion. Major Palmer was a former battery commander with John H. Morgan’s cavalry. The need was probably made worse since Rowan’s sister batteries were had been equipped. Corput’s battery had been reequipped since their loss of four guns at Baker’s Creek and four wagons at Vicksburg. Marshall’s Tennessee battery lost four wagons while foraging near Chattanooga but had been re-equipped in “horses and small articles and different guns”.¹⁷ The end of April, 1864 saw a largely administrative change in the artillery.


Johnston’s Battalion (formerly Palmer’s) joined with John Wesley Eldridge’s and Alfred R.Courtney’s battalions to form an artillery division under Brigadier General Francis A. Shoup’s command with Colonel Robert F. Beckham as chief of artillery.¹⁸ This division now came under the overall command of Gen. John Bell Hood. Johnston’s battalion fielded twelve, twelve-pound Napoleon guns- four each. When added to the other batteries in the Division, there were thirty six guns able to face the enemy.

On May 8-9, 1864, the Campaign for Atlanta began in earnest at Rocky Face Ridge. Stephens Light was located in Crows’ Valley on the eighth of May and met the advancing Federal troops with such fire as to make the enemy withdraw. Only Pvts. N.M. Beverly and J.G. Martin were wounded. The Federals tried again on the ninth but met the same fate as the day before while the battery had no casualties.¹⁹ Stephens Light Artillery helped to cover Johnston’s move to Resaca. On May 14, 1864, Hood, now in command of the corps, ordered Dent’s Alabama battery onto the crest of a small ridge facing the Dalton Road. At right angles to Dent’s position, Capt. Rowan and the Stephens Light Artillery was to construct earthworks to command the Dalton Road. Rowan rightly saw that if Dent’s battery was to be removed or overrun, Stephens Light would be enfilladed with enemy fire from above. Before Rowan could build a traverse to protect his men, the enemy attacked and shot Dent’s men down as soon as they manned their guns. They quickly withdrew leaving Rowan and his men to face the enfillading fire from above. Lt. Ritter had his two guns silenced from the intense fire and Lt. Giles’ two guns soon followed. In Ritter’s section eight men were killed and wounded in a few minutes. Only three men were left to man one of the guns. Lt. Ritter had been knocked over the dirt parapet and the few remaining guns were firing over his head. He yelled for cease fire but due to the noise of battle, no one heard him and he lay exposed to the enemy fire from the front and his comrades’ fire to his rear. He scampered back to safety at the first cease fire called by Capt. Rowan. The company lost eighteen men and nine horses. The spokes of one of the cannons was so chipped by minie balls that they had to be reinforced with false ones to remove it.²⁰ Stephens’ sister battery, Van Corput’s Cherokee Artillery had been placed in an incomplete dirt lunette in front of the main Confederate line. They were to enfillade the advancing Union lines with close cannon fire. Before the entrenchments could be completed the Union forces advanced, on the fifteenth of May, and chased the cannoneers out with bayonet. Part of this charge, however, took them within three hundred yards of Capt. Rowan’s position. Stephens Light Artillery gave them terrific fire



and measured their success at the number of litters it took to clear the dead and wounded from in front of their position. The Federal troops were in turn chased out of the entrenchment and the unmanned guns remained in a no-man’s land until the Federals finally dug into the entrenchments and pulled the guns to the Union side with ropes. On the evening of the fifteenth, Johnston withdrew to the new lines at Adairsville. There were three killed and fifteen wounded at the battle of Resaca.²¹ The accuracy and the distance of the Union rifled guns-ten pound Parrott, twenty pound Parrott, three inch Ordnance-generally overpowered the Confederates in their artillery duel.²² This was to be the relationship between Union and Confederate artillery for most of the remainder of the war. When the Union troops inspected the abandoned Confederate works, they realized how formidable they would have been had they had to take them without the flanking movement. As Colonel Henry Stone of George Thomas’ staff commented, “Not a box of ammunition, not a barrel of hard-tack, not a wagon, not an animal, was left behind. The completeness with which Johnston had made his escape profoundly impressed everybody.”

Johnston continued to move slowly south with Sherman close on his heels trying to force an open confrontation between the two armies. There was skirmishing around Adairsville on the seventeenth on the south bank of the Oothacaloga Creek, along the Western and Atlantic Railroad. The soldiers were told by Johnston that they would now stand and fight. This was met with great enthusiasm but that evening they again withdrew. Hood said he couldn’t hold his part of the line, Polk couldn’t hold his but the weakest part, held by Hardee, was said to be secure.²³ Johnston again moved to the Allatoona Mountains further to the south. Sherman knew of the area from his pre-war time spent in Marietta and knew better than to attack Johnston in that position. He moved to the West towards Dallas, Georgia. Joe Wheeler’s cavalry discovered his intent and the Confederate line formed near New Hope Church. Stevenson’s Division held the right flank.²⁴ Enemy troops moved up but were repulsed by the Confederate troops at every point. An artillery duel lasted for about an hour when a Federal shell set fire to a building near the ammunition. Pvt. W. J. Lewis of Lt. Ritter’s section volunteered to run two hundred yards in front of the Confederate lines through heavy enemy musket fire to fetch water to extinguish the blaze. He was successful and was not wounded. The Stephens Light Artillery had only two wounded this day, May twenty seventh. Stephens Light was moved



further to the right near Granbury’s Texas brigade of Cleburne’s Division on the twenty ninth.²⁵ Capt. Rowan heard a Union work party in front of the Confederate lines at about one o’clock in the morning on the thirtieth. He sent Lt. Ritter and a party to investigate and get the range for the guns. Lt. Ritter crept within one hundred yards, marked the site and upon returning to their lines, they opened fire and heard no more from that party of Federals. A member of Granbury’s Texans, Capt. Samuel T. Foster, recounted the act after the war stating that there were Yankee camps in front of them and they were warned that a Confederate battery was going to fire over the Texan’s heads and into the Yankee camps. He stated that the battery fired for about an hour and when they moved forward to investigate, the camps were empty and many pieces of equipment and food had been left behind; “ oh I am rich; crackers bacon & coffee.”²⁶ That same afternoon, Lt. Ritter went to a stream to rest and wash his feet. A bullet hit the bank near his head. Thinking it was random he stayed in place but when three or four hit the same spot with one nearly hitting him, he decided it was not random and left.

On June 4, 1864, the Confederate New Hope line was abandoned for the Lost Mountain line where Gen. Leonidas Polk was killed by a shell to his chest. It was a Parrott shell fired by the First Ohio Light Artillery²⁷ or the Fifth Indiana Battery (Simonson’s) commanded by Captain Alfred Morrison.²⁸ The Lost Mountain line was then abandoned for the Noonday Valley line. In the area around Marietta, the Confederates were still hungry. One soldier’s wife spoke of her husband in Stevenson’s Division, telling her of having to eat raw corn. It seemed the troops were passing a small farm. The old man who owned the farm told the hungry men to help themselves. They ate the green corn right off the cob.²⁹ On June twenty second, at Marietta, the battery was placed one half mile from the Federal line while General Stevenson’s Division charged. Repulsed, Stevenson’s Division lost one thousand men. Stephens Light was under a severe enemy fire the whole time but lost no cannoneers.

The next move was to Noonday Creek with Hood’s corp astride the railroad then on to Kennesaw Mountain, arriving on that line on June eighteenth. Johnston anticipated Sherman’s move to the flank and moved Hood’s men from the right side to the left of the line. Hood sent Stevenson’s Division along the Powder Springs Road and then ordered him to attack the center of the Federal line, diagonally, at Kolb’s Farm. The attacking troops faced a mass of forty Union cannon firing ninety rounds a minute.³⁰ One of Geary’s, two of Williams’ and two of Hascall’s Federal batteries opened on the Confederates in a crossfire. Knipe’s brigade and Ruger’s joined in. The Confederates ran or hid in a ravine but Williams’ battery dropped plunging fire on them, killing many.³¹

Confederate Gen. Stevenson stated his losses at eight hundred seven killed and wounded; another account listed the losses at eight hundred seventy. The artillery battalion, including Stephens Light Artillery, was held in reserve during the attack but was under long range artillery bombardment.³² On July 4, 1864, the battalion was ordered to the Chattahoochee River line. They then followed the Green’s Ferry Road to with eight miles of Atlanta on the ninth and then on to Mill Creek Road where the enemy attacked but was repulsed on July 20, 1864.

In April, 1864, Hood’s Corps of three battalions of artillery contained forty seven guns. The returns for the Army of Tennessee dated July 10, 1864, showed only thirty six pieces of artillery with forty three officers in Hood’s Corps. There were seven hundred sixty six men with an effective total present of seven hundred forty three. The total aggregate and absent was one thousand three hundred thirty seven.³³

On July seventeenth, President Jefferson Davis removed Gen. Joseph Johnston from command of the Army of Tennessee and replace him with Gen. John Bell Hood. The public supported the replacement of Gen. Johnston for they saw the retreat through Georgia as his unwillingness to fight. In their view, Johnston gave up half the state of Georgia, abandoned one of the finest wheat areas in the Southeast on the eve of its ripening, and at Rome and on the Etowah River, Johnston had surrendered iron-rolling mills and government works of great value.³⁴ However, Johnston was highly respected




by the men in his command. They felt he would take care of them and not put them into harm’s way without a good purpose. They did not feel the same with Gen. Hood who was known to favor the manly art of frontal attacks. This played directly into the hands of General Sherman who wanted to wear the Confederate army down with major battles. Many people with more military understanding believed the replacement was a grave mistake. Johnston had never lost a major battle and never lost a regiment. At the time of his replacement he was in the midst of executing the masterpiece of his professional career with perfection. He had strategically retreated three hundred miles and never lost any supplies or prisoners. Unfortunately, Johnston was replaced with “a man with the heart of a lion but a head of wood”.³⁵ With Hood in command, the number of Confederate desertions increased. In the first ten days of being in command of the army, Hood lost over eighteen thousand men-almost a third of the Army of Tennessee.³⁶

July 22, saw Stephens Light Artillery in action again with their position located in the Peach Tree Street Redoubt which was unfinished. After completion the redoubt was assisted by a thirty two pound siege gun. The enemy moved closer and Captain Rowan began to shell their lines. About sunset General Loring asked Captain Rowan to rapid fire at the enemy as a diversion from the enemy’s left. Confederate General Hardee was to attack on Federal General McPherson’s left flank. This attack was a success for the Confederates captured three thousand prisoners, twenty eight pieces of artillery and many ordnance stores.³⁷ Rowan was to keep up the fire for several days.³⁸ Another thirty two pounder siege gun was brought up two hundred yards in the year and Lt. Ritter was given charge of both thirty two pounders. On August twentieth, these guns were removed to south of Atlanta. Captain M. Van Den Corput, who had been temporarily in command of the battalion since Major Johnston’s wound at Resaca, was wounded about this time and Captain Rowan took command of the battalion. Lt. Ritter was given command of the company.

August 27 found Stephens Light and the battalion six miles south of Atlanta in East Point. Three days later they arrived at Jonesboro and were engaged in action the same day. Another loss at Jonesboro confirmed the fact that the Confederates had to




evacuate Atlanta. Stephens Light’s battalion were sent back to Atlanta on the first of September to help bring out Quartermaster and Ordnance stores. That same night the city was evacuated.³⁹ The artillery reserve stores at Vinings Station of fourteen thousand rounds was blown up. This left only one hundred and six rounds of ammunition per gun. Retreating in good order, the battalion fought a successful rear guard action two miles north of Lovejoy’s Station on October 4th.⁴⁰ This rear guard action was so successful that on October 5th, the Federal troops returned to Atlanta. On the nineteenth, Stephens Light and its battalion was moved to Palmetto Station and took up a position behind a line of fortifications from the Macon Railroad to the Chattahoochee River.

Hood tried to use the artillery more effectively during the battles around Atlanta. The rugged terrain and entrenchments limited its offensive usefulness.⁴¹ Now that Atlanta had fallen, Hood looked for a way to surprise the northern troops in and around the city. He was unable to move them with short attacks so he now made the fateful decision to go behind Sherman’s army and attack his lines of communication and supply. Theoretically this was a sound move but it was poorly planned and executed. Opportunities for small victories slipped away on several occasions. Hood was anxious to keep his “hero” status almost to the point of being psychotic. He associated casualties with valor.⁴² His move wasn’t entirely unsuccessful, however, for Gen. Sherman remarked, “...the rebels had struck our railroad a heavy blow, burning every tie, bending the rails for eight miles, from Big Shanty to above Acworth, so that the estimate for repairs called for thirty five thousand new ties, and six miles of iron.” The bad news was that Col. W.W. Wright came down from Chattanooga and with ten thousand men available for repair work, the rail was repaired in just seven days.⁴³ John T. Wickersham was instructed to destroy a railroad bridge north of Atlanta. He blew it up with gunpowder. He and his compatriots went back to camp satisfied with their work but within one day Union trains were crossing the replaced bridge.⁴⁴

The Atlanta campaign cost an estimated fifty thousand southern lives. April 1 listed the artillery strength of twenty seven batteries at two thousand eight hundred sixty one men or and average of one hundred six per company. On August 31, these same batteries




numbered only two thousand three hundred ninety five or eighty nine men per company or a sixteen percent loss. Half of the officers were also lost during this same period. Many shortages began to appear for the Confederate artillerists. Federal and Confederate batteries were about the same in number but the South had a problem with their supply of ammunition. August 18, saw Hood with only one hundred twenty five rounds per gun while the Union guns had an average of four hundred rounds at any time. According to lists, the Confederates were also short one hundred fifty six saddles, three hundred sixteen bridles, six hundred ninety one halters, two hundred ninety eight saddle blankets, five hundred forty eight curry combs, five hundred forty one horse brushes, and seventeen sets of harness. The men themselves were short of clothing, shoes, and equipment. Even the horses were not faring well. Out of two thousand one hundred fifty six horses on hand, one hundred sixty four were unserviceable and each battery averaged only fifty one horses each.

The march to Tennessee began with Hood splitting his army up at Cedartown. Those without shoes (they were short one thousand six hundred fifty one pair) and all the artillery except one battery from each battalion.⁴⁵ Stephens Light Artillery was selected to accompany Stevenson’s Division of Gen. Stephen D. Lee’s Corps to Resaca on Oct. 9, 1864 and capture the Union garrison there. Unconditional surrender was demanded of the commander, Col. Clark Wever, but being well fortified, Col. Wever declined stating, “...if you want it, come and take it”. Thankfully for the Confederates, a frontal assault against fortified positions was called off and they continued to Villenow going through Snake Creek Gap on Oct. 14. This was the same Snake Creek Gap Union troops came through in their attempt to surprise Johnston in Dalton earlier that year.⁴⁶ Cheatham’s and Stewart’s Corps, which had been sent to capture Union troops stationed at Tilton and Dalton met them there. The reunited Army of Tennessee marched through the Chattanooga Valley and rejoined their wagons and the rest of the artillery at Gadsen, Alabama on October 21. During this time period, Sherman decided against following Hood into Tennessee. He saw that Georgia and South Carolina lay literally at his mercy and decided to head to the coast. “If he (Hood) will go to the river (Ohio River),” Sherman said, “I will give him the rations.”⁴⁷

The Army of Tennessee crossed the Tennessee River, easily defeated a small garrison at Florence and rested for three weeks. Hood’s shock effect on the Union forces in the area was lost but the respite was desperately needed by the southern troops. They re-equipped and for those who still did not have shoes, Gen. Stephen D. Lee ordered them to fashion moccasins out of fresh beef hides with the hairy side inside and tie them.⁴⁸ During the crossing of the river and for days after there was heavy skirmishing with the Federal rear guard. Upon reaching the lines for the battle of Franklin, six guns of Johnston’s battalion were on the line with Gen. Stevenson, the other two ( one of which was Stephens Light)⁴⁹ were held in reserve. Before the battle, around midnight, the reserve was sent to the left of the Columbia (Franklin) Pike facing North.⁵⁰ They were never called up for the battle of Franklin. They moved to within six miles of Nashville, then within one and one half miles where they commenced to build protection. At eleven o’clock p.m. they were moved a final time and were positioned in an empty field. At eight am on the morning of the sixteenth of December, one and one half miles left of the pike they commenced building defensive works. The Federal artillery heard the noises and opened battery fire on the work crew. The work crew simply laid down until after the battery fire then worked in the lulls before the next cannonade. When the battle opened the sixteenth, Lt. Ritter was moving the horses to a safer place when he saw a shell coming straight at him. He jumped behind a tree with the shell striking the opposite side. Two more Federal batteries were installed bringing the total of enemy guns facing the Stephens Light Artillery to eighteen. As the fighting grew fiercer, Capt. Rowan ordered the drivers to assist the cannoneers bringing ammunition to the guns. Lt. Ritter was on his horse preparing to move the horses to another place when a Parrott shell passed through the head of a wheel horse near him, exploded, and killed his saddle horse and broke his sword in half.⁵¹ The enemy charged Stevenson’s line and the rest of Johnston’s artillery battalion did deadly business with “canister, killing and wounding large numbers.” Enemy artillery fire was terrific with a large number of horses killed and two limber chests exploded. The confederate infantry had retreated leaving the artillery to basically fend for themselves but most serviceable guns were taken.

Lt. Gen. S.D. Lee commended his artillery, including the Stephens Light, during the previous actions. He stated that his Artillery Corps on the sixteenth, lost sixteen guns on the lines. Most of them were without horses, having been disabled during the day during the long range enemy artillery fire. Many of the carriages were also disabled. Some gunners were reluctant to leave their guns and fought on until the enemy were almost within reach before they left.⁵² Rowan’s battery lost four guns but they had an even greater loss: Captain Rowan, leader of the Stephens Light Artillery, was killed during this battle on the morning of the sixteenth.⁵³ A shell came through the right flare of the embrasure of the second gun, bursting the moment it cleared the parapet. This explosion sent a piece of the shell through Capt. Rowan’s body instantly killing him. The same fragment continued through Rowan’s body and wounded private Early. It was raining, freezing, and muddy. Before they could remove Rowan’s body from the field, advancing enemy troops were so close that Lt. Ritter saw little chance of removing the guns so he and the rest of Stephens Light and their sister battery the Cherokee Light stayed on the guns firing as long as possible. They continued to pour canister on the advancing lines of blue until they mounted the works. The enemy climbed the left side, planted the stars and stripes and captured sixteen men. As soon as the enemy heads could be seen above the parapets, Lts. Ritter and Doncaster, along with Sergeant Pendley and others, ran across the field on the opposite side that the enemy was entering from. They were chased and fired upon for three quarters of a mile. During their race for freedom, they inadvertently ran between a Federal battery firing on retreating Confederate soldiers and in turn being fired upon with canister by members of Stephens Light’s own artillery battalion. They escaped unharmed and rejoined their battery four miles to the rear. Stephens Light losses at Nashville were four killed (Captain John B. Rowan, Pvts. S. Aultman, E.R. Roach, and A. Wills), eight wounded (A. Dollar, D. Beasley, N. Beverly, W.J. Brown, T. Early, H.A.Davis, E.M. Herndon and J. Nichols), and ten captured (Cpls, A.G. Cox, S. Hylton, B. Bradford, Pvts. J.M. Carey, J.J. Martin, F.M. Newton, W. Rogers, G.R. Shipley, M.L. Welsh, I. Zimmerman). Those listed as captured do not include Lt. Giles and Pvt. Colter who were out foraging for supplies and were captured by the enemy two days before the battle.⁵⁴

The ground was frozen, it had been raining, sleeting, or snowing for many of the days since the beginning of December. The many shoeless Confederate soldiers literally left bloody footprints on the snowy roads because they had had no chance for supplies, much of what they had was lost at Nashville. On one occasion the tired horses couldn’t pull a wagon up a hill. Gen. Cheatham sent word to find one hundred well-shoed men to come and assist the wagon. Out of Cheatham’s entire Corps, only twenty five men could be found with whole shoes.⁵⁵

Hood’s losses from November twenty to December twenty in killed, wounded, and captured amounted to thirteen thousand three hundred and three men which was approximately half of the number that crossed the Tennessee River in November. He also lost sixty four guns, seventy five limbers, twenty caissons, and six wagons of ammunition. For comparison purposes, before Johnston was relieved, the Army of Tennessee had one hundred eighty seven guns and four thousand six hundred cannoneers. When he got the Army back from Gen. Hood there were only fifty nine guns left, many drawn by mules and a few by oxen.⁵⁶

S.D. Lee’s Corps continued to support the Confederate withdrawal until they reached Brentwood, Tennessee. The rain again turned to sleet. The Federals were beginning to slow in their pursuit of the Rebels. They lost many men at Overton Hill and though they were much better equipped for the weather, the roads were close to impassable due to deep mud.⁵⁷ On the morning of the seventeenth, S.D. Lee’s Corps crossed the Harpeth River and burned the bridge. S.D. Lee was wounded and Gen. Carter L. Stevenson took command. Nathan Bedford Forrest and his cavalry arrived and relieved the rear guard, much to their relief having continuous skirmishing for four days.⁵⁸

The Army of Tennessee continued their shoeless retreat through the snow heading toward Tupelo, Mississippi. On the eighteenth of December, while passing through Columbia, Tennessee, Stephens Light commandeered a twelve pound field howitzer that had been abandoned. Lieutenant Ritter received his promotion to captain on the twentieth of December. Stephens Light’s artillery battalion was heading to Rienza,



Mississippi arriving there on the thirtieth of December. At Rienza, the battalion received orders to continue to Columbus, Mississippi. In Columbus, they gave up their only gun-the field howitzer- because no field howitzers were then in use in the Army of Tennessee. While in Columbus, the battalion was the first to be chosen to prepare for the march to the east to join with Gen. Johnston’s forces in the Carolinas. Colonel M. Smith informed Captain Ritter that the plans had been changed. General P.G.T. Beauregard had requested that his son, Rene, and his artillery battery, Ferguson’s South Carolina battery go with Johnston’s battery join forces with Johnston instead.

On Christmas Day, 1864, Capt. William L. Ritter and the Stephens Light Artillery was transferred to Cobb’s battalion, Smith’s regiment of artillery. The battalion was ordered two miles north of Columbus, on the east side of the river. There they were to make winter camp. Immediately after finishing their quarters, the battalion was ordered to Mobile, Alabama.⁵⁹

In Mobile, Ritter’s battery was assigned to the right wing of the defenses of Mobile. Cobb’s Battalion was commanded by Capt. Cuthbert A. Slocomb and included Phillip’s battery under Capt J.W. Phillips, Ritter’s battery under Capt William L. Ritter, and Slocomb’s battery under Lt. J. Ad. Chalaron.⁶⁰ Ritter’s assignment was to command Battery D, a redoubt of seven heavy artillery guns.⁶¹ They fought in the defenses of Mobile from March 17, 1865 to April 12, 1865. They were surrendered to Federal forces by Lieutenant Richard Taylor, commanding the Department of Alabama, Mississippi, and East Louisiana, at Citronelle, Alabama on May 4, 1865, after fighting for a month after Lee surrendered at Appomattox.⁶² After the evacuation of Mobile, Ritter and his men were ordered to Meridian, Mississippi were they were paroled May 10, 1865. Capt. William L. Ritter arrived home in February, 1866, after an absence of four years and four months. In November of 1867, he married the widow of his beloved captain and comrade in arms John B. Rowan.⁶³

1. Amann, William Frayne, ed., Personnel of the Civil War, (Thomas Yoseloff, New York, 1961), Vol. 1, p.182,299.
2. Crute, Joseph E. Units of the Confederate States Army, (Derwent Books, Midlothian, Va. 1987) p. 122.
3. Official Records of the Union and Confederate Armies. Chap. XLIII. p.662.
4. Ritter, William L. sketch of the Third Battery Maryland Artillery. Southern Historical Society Papers, Vol. XII, p. 439.
5. Crute, p. 162.
6. Ibid., p. 115,186.
7. Official Records. Vol.. XLIV, p. 826.
8. Ritter, p. 116.
9. Foote, Shelby. The Civil War, A Narrative: Red River to Appomattox. (Random House, New York, NY. 1974). p. 850.
10. Confederate Military History, Vol. 6, Chap. XIV.
11. Ritter, p. 116.
12. Scaife, William R., The Campaign for Atlanta. (McNaughton and Gunn, Inc., Saline, Michigan), 1993. p.15-16.
13. Official Records. Vol. XLIV, p. 885.
14. Ritter, p. 433-438.
15. Official Records, Chap.XLIV, p. 820.
16. Ritter, P. 117.
17. Official Records, Vol. XLIV, p. 693.
18. Daniel, Larry J.,Cannoneers in Gray: The Field Artillery for the Army of Tennessee, 1861-1865. (University of Alabama Press, Tuscaloosa, Al.), 1984. p. 130.
19. Ritter, April-May, 1883, No. 5.
20. Daniel, p. 145.
21. Ritter, No. 5.
22. Daniel, p. 145.
23. Ritter, p. 190.
24. Foote, Shelby, The Civil War, A Narrative: Red River to Appomattox, (Random House, New York, 1974), p. 348.
25. Ibid., p. 350.
    
    
    
    
26. Foster, Jr., W.A., Paulding County: Its People and Places, (W. H. Wolfe Associates, Roswell, Ga., 1983), p. 79-80.
27. Foote, Red River to Appomattox, p. 355-356.
28. Scaife, p. 62.
29. Georgia Division, United Daughters of the Confederacy, Confederate Reminiscences and Letters 1861-1865. 1996, Vol. II, p. 8.
30. Bailey, Ronald H., Battles For Atlanta: Sherman Moves East, (Time Life Books, Alexandria, Va. 1985), p. 64.
31. Castel. Albert, Decision in the West: The Atlanta Campaign of 1864., (Univ. Press of Kansas, 1992), p. 295.
32. Foote, Red River, p. 393.
33. Official Records, Chap. L, p. 678.
34. Pollard, E.A.,ed., A Southern History of the War, (Charles B. Richardson, publ., New York, 1866), Vol II, Chap. XII, P. 284.
35. Ibid., Vol. II, Chap. XVIII, p. 382.
36. Bailey, p. 136.
37. Ritter, p. 192.
38. Daniel, p. 158.
39. Ritter, p. 192-193.
40. Daniel, p. 164-165, 167.
41. Ibid., p. 160.
42. McMurry, Richard M., Two Great Rebel Armies, (University of North Carolina Press, Chapel Hill and London), 1989, p. 131.
43. Botkin, B.A., ed., A Civil War Treasury of Tales, Legends, and Folklore. (Promontory Press, New York), 1960. p. 376.
44. Ibid., p. 387.
45. Daniel, p. 163-165.
46. Official Records I, Vol. 45, Pt. III, p. 692.
47. Pollard, A Southern History of the War, p. 419.
48. Hattaway, Herman, General Stephen D. Lee. (University Press of Mississippi, Jackson, Mississippi), 1976. p. 132.
49. Cunningham, S.A.,ed., Confederate Veteran Magazine, (Nashville, Tn.,Jan. 1911), Vol. XIX, p. 218.
50. Cunningham, Confederate Veteran Magazine, Vol. XIV, p.353.
51. Ritter, p. 542.
    
    
    
    
52. Official Records, Chap. LVIL, p. 690.
53. Ibid., p. 692.
54. Ritter, p. 543.
55. Scaife, William R., Hood’s Campaign for Tennessee, (Atlanta, Ga., printed in U.S.A.), 1986, p. 69.
56. Daniel, p. 180.
57. Foote, Red River, p. 705.
58. Ibid., p. 707.
59. Ibid., p. 172.
60. Official Records I, Vol. 49, pt. I, p.1047.
61. Cunningham, Confederate Veteran, Vol. XXII, p. 172.
62. Sifakis, Stewart, Compendium of the Confederate Armies: South Carolina and Georgia, (Facts on File, Printed in U.S.A. 1995), p. 143.
63. Cunningham, Confederate Veteran, Vol. XXXVI, P. 348.

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• Crute, Joseph E. Units of the Confederate States Army. Midlothian, Va.: Derwent Books. 1987.
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• Foster, Jr., W.A. Paulding County: It’s People and Places. Roswell, Georgia: W. H. Wolfe Associates. 1983.
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